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Book Review
Andrew Flavelle Martin, Orphans No More: A Review of Elizabeth
Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges of
Government Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018).
Introduction
Are government lawyers different than lawyers in private practice?
If so, why does it matter? While these questions have been addressed
piecemeal in the Canadian legal ethics literature, Elizabeth Sanderson's
Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government
Lawyers is the first comprehensive and long-form answer to them.1 As
Adam Dodek hints in the foreword 2 and has noted elsewhere,3 the degree
to which government lawyers have been overlooked in the Canadian legal
literature is incongruent with their sheer numbers as a proportion of the
legal profession in Canada. The need for this book is pronounced.
Sanderson's goal, in her words, "is to draw out a standard of
government lawyering, a standard which many government lawyers
understand implicitly .... poin[ting] to elements of a basic, targeted
standard against which actions of government lawyers can be judged."4
The accomplishment of this book is that it articulates and supports such
a standard as well as offering a coherent vision of government lawyering.
Sanderson's work is a singular achievement that represents a
culmination of growing scholarly attention over the last decade.5 In 2008,
1. Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government
Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018).
2. Sanderson, ibid, foreword at iii.
3. Adam M Dodek, "Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law" (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1 at 4 [Dodek, "Intersection"].
4. Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxviii.
5. Andrew Flavelle Martin, "Legal Ethics and the Political Activity of Government Lawyers"
(2018) 49:2 Ottawa L Rev 263 [Martin, "Political Activity"]; Adam Dodek, "The 'Unique Role' of
Government Lawyers in Canada" (2016) 49:1 Israel LR 23; Kerry Wilkins, "Reasoning with the
Elephant: The Crown, Its Counsel and Aboriginal Law in Canada" (2016) 13 Indigenous LJ 27; Micah
B Rankin, "The Trials, Tribulations and Troubling Revelations of Government Lawyers in Canada"
(2014) 17:2 Leg Ethics 303; Michael H Morris & Sandra Nishikawa, "The Orphans of Legal Ethics:
Why Government Lawyers Are Different-and How We Protect and Promote that Difference in
Service of the Rule of Law and the Public Interest" (2013) 26:2 Can J Admin L & Prac 171; Patrick
J Monahan, "'In the Public Interest': Understanding the Special Role of the Government Lawyer"
(2013) 63 SCLR (2d) 43; Malliha Wilson, Taia Wong & Kevin Hille, "Professionalism and the Public
Interest" (2011) 38:1 Advocates' Q 1; Dodek, "Intersection", supra note 3; John Mark Keyes, "The
Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel" (2011) 5 JPPL 11; Joshua Wilner, "Service to
the Nation: A Living Legal Value for Justice Lawyers in Canada" (2009) 32:1 Dal LJ 177; Allan
C Hutchinson, "'In the Public Interest': The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers"
(2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 105.
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Allan Hutchinson labeled government lawyers the "orphans of legal
ethics."6 With this book, that label can finally be left behind.
This book review begins by setting out Sanderson's position on a
few concepts key to legal ethics for government lawyers: a definition
of government lawyers, an account of the duties that apply to them, and
the identity of the client. It then goes on to highlight the book's major
contributions. Finally, it sets out areas for future research building on
Sanderson's work.
Key concepts for government lawyers: the definition, the duties, and the
client
Fundamental to Sanderson's analysis are her definition of "government
lawyers," her differentiation of three sets of duties that apply to them,
and her assessment of the identity of the client. She defines government
lawyers as "public servants practising law in the service of the Crown
within the federal Department of Justice or within provincial or territorial
counterparts or within client departments," which she also refers to as
"practicing lawyers working within government on behalf of ministers of
departments of justice or of attorneys general."' She locates this group
within a broader category of "public sector lawyers," which includes
lawyers for the judiciary or Parliament or the legislatures, as well as
those practicing in "statutory bodies such as the office of the Access to
Information or Privacy Commissioners or Canadian Human Rights
Commission. "8
This definition is largely consistent with definitions in the existing
literature. For example, Dodek defines government lawyers as "lawyers
for the executive branch."9 However, Sanderson's reference to "statutory
bodies" seems somewhat vague. The distinction between a department
or ministry, on the one hand, and an agency or other body on the other,
is not necessarily clear-after all, most departments and ministries are
established, or at least recognized and continued, in statute. "Statutory
bodies" that are established as arms or officers of the legislature can be
clearly identified, but once one moves on to creatures of the executive,
the boundaries become fuzzy. From an administrative law perspective, a
commission or a tribunal is as much part of "the executive" as a department
or a ministry.
6. Hutchinson, ibid at 106, quoted in Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxvii.
7. Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxiii.
8. Ibid at xxiii.
9. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 3 at 9.
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Having said that, the definition is a useful and largely workable one.
Crown prosecutors are clearly included, although Sanderson rightly
focuses less on this one group that has been adequately covered in the case
law and literature. So are civil litigators, solicitors, lawyers providing all
kinds of legal advice, and legislative counsel.0 Her definition also has to be
read in conjunction with her recognition later in the first chapter that there
are "a few specific exemptions to this [the Minister of Justice's] monopoly
in the provision of legal services to government", giving as examples the
Canadian Forces and international law functions at the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.11 Under her definition, these are
not "government lawyers" because they are not delegates of the Minister
of Justice.12
A second fundamental part of Sanderson's analysis are her three
"layers" of duties that apply to government lawyers: "professional
duties", "public law duties," and "public sector duties."13 One layer, which
largely mirrors lawyers in private practice, is their "professional duties"
as members of a law society.14 Another layer is "the public law duties
derived from the ancient, constitutional office of the Attorney General now
codified in statute."15 The final layer is "public service duties.. .that they
share with other public servants as government employees."16 Sanderson
also acknowledges the common-law duties of all lawyers in contract and
tort,17 although these she does not give these duties their own layer.
These three "layers" of duties are not original, as they map closely
onto the three sides of Dodek's "rule of law triangle," those being "as
delegates of the Attorney General, as public servants and as members
of the legal profession." 8 However, each layer of duties is developed in
detail. And while the terminology of "layers" may suggest that each set of
duties is independent, Sanderson is clear throughout that there is interplay
10. See, e.g., Sanderson, supra note 1 at 139-140, 143.
11. Sanderson, ibidat 41.
12. Although somewhat circular, this aspect does clarify the "statutory bodies" exception, i.e. these
bodies are part of the executive (and so their lawyers are government lawyers), unless their lawyers
do not report to the Minister of Justice (and so are not government lawyers).
13. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 48. She is explicit that there may be additional layers of duties,
referring to "at least three layers of duties."
14. Ibid at 12. She notes that some of these duties, such as fees, are irrelevant to government lawyers.
15. Ibid at 2.
16. Ibid at 2. See also ibid at 48: "In summary, government lawyers are subject to at least three
layers of duties. The first set of professional duties comes from their membership in provincial and
territorial law societies. The second set of public law duties comes with their responsibilities to the
Minister of Justice and ex officio, the Attorney General. The third set comes with their employment in
the Public Service."
17. Ibidat5-6.
18. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 3 at 20.
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among the three,19 although more exploration of this interplay would have
been welcome.20
Sanderson uses these three layers to provide excellent analytical
clarity. Most importantly, the law societies can only discipline lawyers
for breach of their professional duties, not their public law duties or their
public service duties.21 Similarly, the layers allow Sanderson to make good
sense of Everingham v. Ontario, in which the Ontario Divisional Court
held that government lawyers are held to "the same single high standard of
professional conduct" as all lawyers, but also recognized that government
lawyers have "special public obligations" and Crown prosecutors have
"public interest duties."22 Under Sanderson's analysis, the law society only
has jurisdiction over the one layer of "professional obligations," but it is
not inconsistent to recognize two other layers of duties.
With the exception of the three layers of duties, Sanderson situates
her analysis in a comprehensive application of the existing literature.
Particularly notable is her focus on the role of the Attorney General,
drawing heavily on the work of John Ll J Edwards.23 While this is not a
book on the Attorney General, government lawyers can only be understood
properly as delegates of the Attorney General, i.e. in terms of Sanderson's
"public law duties" layer.
A third fundamental part of Sanderson's analysis is her discussion
of the identity of the government lawyer's client. Sanderson emphasizes
that the client is the Crown-as she puts it, "the executive branch of
government vested in the single and indivisible Crown in right of Canada
or in the right of a province."24 (As in her definition of government lawyers,
she excludes "agencies created by statute, with their own in-house legal
services," although the distinction she draws is not always a clear one.2 )
19. See, e.g., Sanderson, supra note 1 at 17: "Government lawyers must therefore be mindful
of their ethical challenge of marrying their professional duties as members of their respective law
societies with their public law duties exercised on behalf of the Minister in the institutional context of
a government department". See also Sanderson, supra note 1 at 43: Government lawyers "must find a
means to align their professional duties as members of the practising bar with their public law duties
exercised on behalf of the Minister of Justice, and with their duties as public servants."
20. See, e.g., Martin, "Political Activity," supra note 5.
21. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 13.
22. Ibid at 14-15; Everingham v Ontario (1992), 8 OR (3d) 121 at 125-126, 88 DLR (4th) 755 (Div
Ct), aff'g on other grounds (1991) 84 DLR (4th) 354, 3 CPC (3d) 87 (Ont Gen Div).
23. See esp. John Ll J Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964)
and John Ll J Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London, UK: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1984).
24. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 102.
25. Ibid at 102. Her exclusion of officers of Parliament from "the Crown" is clear.
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This single overarching client, as opposed to an individual Department or
Ministry or Minister, has serious implications for the government lawyer:
government lawyers must resist any temptationto advance the perspective
of that department to the detriment of other parts of government .... The
goal of government lawyers should be to find a common approach for
a single client, albeit with various constituent parts. The lawyers within
departments must resist adversarial or positional stances in relation
to colleagues in other parts of government. Government lawyers
collectively must bring together various perspectives of Ministers,
departmental mandates and officials to ensure consistency in the Crown's
legal positions... 26
While her analysis appears correct in law, it does not incorporate practical
realities on the ground. In particular, it glosses over the fact that different
departments may sometimes have separate policy interests and even
adverse legal interests. Sanderson recognizes this problem but appears to
over-minimalize it as "inevitable institutional tension.
27
Major contributions
In this part I highlight what I consider to be the four most important
contributions of Sanderson's book. The first is an emphasis on the role of the
Deputy Attorney General as an interface between the non-partisan public
service and the Minister of the day. A second is Sanderson's extensive
reflection on reconciliation. A third is a critique of common comparisons
between the role of the Minister of Justice in Canada and in New Zealand.
The fourth, and most intriguing, is the suggestion that Parliament could
establish a separate regulatory apparatus for federal government lawyers
that would remove them from law society jurisdiction.
One of Sanderson's key contributions comes in the fifth chapter,
which focuses on the role of the Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy
Attorney General. Commentators, including Sanderson, typically describe
government lawyers as delegates of the Attorney General. However, from
a civil service perspective it is the Deputy Attorney General, rather than
the Attorney General, to whom civil servants-including government
lawyers-report. This distinction is often overlooked, or at least fudged,
in the legal ethics literature.28 As Sanderson emphasizes, through the
26. Ibid at 106.
27. Ibid at 136
28. But see, e.g., Andrew Flavelle Martin, "The Minister's Office Lawyer: A Challenge to the Role of
the Attorney General?" (2019) 12 JPPL 641 at 645: "under a traditional civil service lens government
lawyers, as government employees in the Ministry of the Attorney General, report not to the Attorney
General but to the Deputy Attorney General, who then interfaces with the Minister's office." [Citation
omitted.]
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constitutional convention of political neutrality in the public service,
"Ministers constitutionally play no role in the day-to-day supervision of
public servants in the Departments over which they preside."29 She also
considers circumstances in which a Deputy Attorney General may choose
to resign, particularly the rejection of their legal advice that a course of
action would be unlawful.
30
Another key contribution is a thirty-five page reflection on
reconciliation, which is presented as a case study but could stand on its
own. It is thoughtful and respectful, while clearly covering key concepts
and legal principles in an accessible way that requires little background
knowledge. Its inclusion here is important, as government lawyers will
certainly have a key role to play in the progress toward reconciliation.
One of Sanderson's more intriguing original ideas comes in her analysis
of section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, the provision requiring the
Minister of Justice to inform the House of Commons if government bills
are inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.31
Commentators typically use a similar provision in the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act 1990, under which many reports have been made, to argue
that there is a problem in the application of section 4.1, under which no
reports have ever been made. 32 However, Sanderson provides a persuasive
argument that New Zealand is not a useful comparator.33
Sanderson's most intriguing contribution comes in the first chapter.
She argues that Parliament could create its own enforceable code of
conduct for federal government lawyers that would "ous[t] provincial
jurisdiction.1 34 (She also argues, less provocatively, that provincial and
territorial legislatures could create an enforceable code of conduct for
provincial and territorial government lawyers.) Sanderson anchors this
possibility by applying Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, in
which paramountcy provided that federal legislation allowing non-lawyers
to appear in front of the Immigration and Refugee Board prevailed over
provincial legislation prohibiting non-lawyers from practicing law.35
29. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 213.
30. Ibid at 222.
31. Ibid at 153-167; Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11.
32. See, e.g., Kent Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender
of the Rule of Law" (2006) 31:2 Queen's LJ 598 at 602-603, 626-629.
33. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 159-161. In short, the New Zealand Bill of Rights does not allow
courts to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with those rights-making debate and deliberation
in the legislature relatively more important than in Canada.
34. Ibid at 3-4 (quote is from 4).
35. Ibid at 4; Law Society of British Columbia v Mangat, 2001 SCC 67 at para 73.
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While Sanderson is correct that such an innovation would prevail over
provincial jurisdiction (and thus provincial law society jurisdiction) over
the practice of law, it is less clear that in the absence of such a scheme
provincial law societies actually have jurisdiction over federal government
lawyers. Sanderson accepts at face value, and relies on, the obiterinKrieger
v. Law Society ofAlberta.36 The Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger held
that provincial law societies have disciplinary jurisdiction over provincial
Crown prosecutors.3" Without acknowledging that it was obiter, the Court
also stated that law societies have disciplinary jurisdiction over federal
Crown prosecutors.38 In my view, it is an open question whether federalism
considerations, which the Court in Krieger did not address, limit or even
preclude law society jurisdiction over lawyers for the federal government.
Similarly, Sanderson also appears to assume that Schmidt v. Canada
(Attorney General), was correctly decided.39 Justice Stratas for the Federal
Court of Appeal stated in Schmidt that the Attorney General and Minister
of Justice is not a lawyer to the legislature. However, this conclusion
seems contrary to the historical analysis that Sanderson herself provides.4"
For example, while she recognizes one of the functions of the Attorney
General transposed from England as being "to advise members on legal
implications in matters before the House,"41 she doesn't include this as one
of the "devolved duties" incorporated from England into Canada under
section 5(a) of the Department of Justice Act.42 And while she recognizes
that the Attorney General has duties to Parliament,43 she restricts the
relevant duty to "explaining the government's legal position," which is
narrower than a duty to advise on legal implications.44
36. Krieger v Law Society ofAlberta, 2002 SCC 65.
37. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 3; Krieger, supra note 36 at para 4.
38. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 3;Krieger, supra note 36 atpara 56: "A law sciety hasthejuisdiction
to review the conduct of a federal or provincial Crown prosecutor to determine whether the prosecutor
has acted dishonestly or in bad faith in exercising prosecutorial discretion or fulfilling the disclosure
obligations of the Crown As members of their respective law societies, federal Crown prosecutors are
subject to the same ethical obligations as all other members of the bar and not immune to discipline
for dishonest or bad faith conduct."
39. Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 55, aff'g 2016 FC 269.
40. See also the obiter in Krieger, supra note 36 at para 27: "[a]s in England, they [Attorneys
General] serve as Law Officers to their respective legislatures" as quoted in Andrew Flavelle Martin
"The Attorney General's Forgotten Role as Legal Advisor to the Legislature: A Comment on Schmidt
v Canada (Attorney General)" (2019) 52:1 UBC L Rev 201 at 215.
41. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 25. From the context, "members" here appears to mean members of
the House as opposed to members of Cabinet.
42. Ibid at 39; Department ofJustice Act, supra note 31.
43. Ibid at 117-120.
44. Ibidat 119-120.
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Sanderson closes the book with what she calls "a sample code of
government lawyering."45 This Code is essentially a precis of her key
points, organized into rules and commentary-no easy task, given the
complexity of her analysis. The value of this Code, which in no way
replaces the Code of Conduct of a provincial or territorial law society,
is as an easy reference document for government lawyers, and will be
particularly useful for new government lawyers.
What comes next: Future research
Sanderson's book is a commendable contribution to the Canadian legal
ethics literature, but there is only so much a single book can accomplish.
Government Lawyering provides a foundation and a stepping stone to
a range of future research issues. There are at least three areas for such
future research.
First, and perhaps most obvious, are the lawyers that Sanderson
excludes from her definition of "government lawyers" and the lawyers
she identifies as an exception to the Minister of Justice's "monopoly"
on the provision of legal services. Most important, in my view, are what
she describes as lawyers working "in court administrations,"46 which I
understand to include law clerks, staff lawyers, and executive legal officers.
As focus increases in the Canadian legal literature on judicial ethics,4" so
too should focus increase on the lawyers who advise judges.4" As I have
argued in the context of political activity,49 perhaps some duties imposed
on judges should also apply to their lawyers. Almost as important, in terms
of a group needing future research, are lawyers in the Canadian Forces.
Following Sanderson's layers approach, such lawyers have at least two
layers of duties: the professional obligations that apply to all lawyers, and
what we might term the "military duties" or "officers' duties" that apply to
these lawyers as officers under military law.
Second, as I mentioned above, another area for future research is
the implication of federalism for the provincial regulation of federal
government lawyers. Sanderson plants some seeds here but more work is
warranted.
45. Ibidat 228-250.
46. Ibid at xxiii.
47. See, e.g., Stephen GA Pitel & Liam Ledgerwood, "Judicial Confidentiality in Canada" (2017)
43:1 Queen's U 123; Stephen GA Pitel & Michal Malecki, "Judicial Fundraising in Canada" (2015)
52 Alta L Rev 519; Thomas Cromwell, "The Development of Principles of Judicial Ethics" (2012)
56 SCLR (2d) 101; Stephen GA Pitel & Will Bortolin, "Revising Canada's Ethical Rules for Judges
Returning to Practice" (2011) 34 Dal U 483.
48. See also, e.g., Joshua Wilner, "To Be or Not to Be? Some Legal Ethics for Judicial Law Clerks"
(2011) 89:3 Can Bar Rev 611.
49. Martin, "Political Activity," supra note 5 at 291-292.
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A third area for future research is the interplay among the three
layers of duties. Sanderson recognizes the potential for this interplay but,
understandably, does not explore it in detail. For example, when do public
service duties conflict with professional duties, and what is the lawyer to
do? Sanderson gives the example of whistleblowing legislation." Another
is political activity. 1 As I mentioned above, while Sanderson recognizes
the common-law duties of lawyers in tort and contract, these duties
seem to be missing from her three layers. This set of duties is worthy
of consideration alongside the other three. Likewise, although Sanderson
emphasizes the importance ofbijuralism for federal government lawyers,52
the book largely overlooks the private law duties of government lawyers
under civil law in Quebec.
Conclusion
Sanderson's Government Lawyering unquestionably fills what Adam
Dodek describes as a "void" in the Canadian legal ethics literature.53 Her
main contribution is a clear, coherent, and supported account of three
sets of duties that apply to government lawyers: professional, public law,
and public service. In providing this account, Sanderson draws from the
existing literature and notes its disagreements without getting bogged
down in those disagreements. She acknowledges the uniquely Canadian
context of these duties, while drawing on noteworthy foreign examples
and explaining their relevance. In doing all these things, the book provides
a solid foundation for government lawyers in practice and for future
research. Moreover, it will be valuable to stakeholders, and to lawyers in
private practice, who seek to better understand the government lawyers
with whom they interact.
Andrew Flavelle Martin*
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Peter A. Allard School of Law
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50. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 149: "However, resorting to the scheme under this Act may have
implications for the exercise of their professional duty of confidentiality as practicing lawyers."
51. Martin, "Political Activity," supra note 5.
52. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 87.
53. Ibid, foreword at iii.
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